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The relationship between psychoanalysis and psychiatry has been understandably 
complex and not without its difficulties. In this chapter I will endeavour to provide a 
conceptual framework for thinking about the differences between a psychiatric and a 
psychoanalytic approach. I will explore how the two disciplines might relate to each other 
in a more productive way and, through illustrations, show the relevance of analytic 
thinking to general psychiatric settings.  
 
The term psychoanalysis covers a wide range which can be encompassed within the 
following broad categories: a body of knowledge of mind, a research method and a way 
of treating mental disorder. It will be important to keep this broad frame of reference in 
mind – for, in discussion of psychoanalysis in the context of psychiatry, it is easy to slip 
into thinking of it as solely a form of treatment for individual patients. This is a 
misunderstanding to be resisted, for reasons which will I hope become clear within the 
course of this chapter. For, it is as a direct consequence of its range that psychoanalysis 
has so much to contribute to the understanding and treatment of mental illness. 
 
Psychoanalysis and psychiatry occupy conceptual domains that do not map onto each 
other and that are not symmetrical. Psychiatric theory and practice are informed by a 
large number of conceptually distinct paradigms. Some of these paradigms can live more 
or less happily alongside each other whilst others are in direct contradiction; some are 
entirely consistent with a psychoanalytic perspective, others are to varying degrees 
opposed to the whole approach that psychoanalysis represents. If one thinks, for example, 
of the situation where a patient requires medication, much may depend upon the context 
within which it is given. Where this context emphasises an understanding of the 
psychological development of the illness, its meaning within current personal and social 
circumstances, there is no contradiction with psychoanalysis. But where the illness is 
‘understood’ as a purely biological1 phenomenon distinct from the person in which it 
manifests itself, that is where the person is viewed as a passive recipient of a pathological 
process, an object of this process and not subject, then the contradiction with a 
psychoanalytic perspective is clear. 
 
The broad reach of psychoanalysis, involving literature, philosophy and culture is not 
unrelated to its manner of approaching mental disorder for, from this perspective, the 
dividing line between normality and abnormality is less clear and more complex. 
 
Some Characteristics of Psychoanalytic Understanding 
 Normality and Abnormality 
Psychoanalysis does not investigate the human condition from the perspective of 
‘normality’, which was for Freud a convenient fiction. The relation of the abnormal to the 
normal in psychoanalysis is at once more complex and more problematic. Careful study 
of the abnormal reveals what the normal hides, shows what is immanent in it, for the 
neurotic speaks loudly about what the rest of us keep secret. It was Freud’s appreciation 
of what was revealed in delusions of observation (an abnormal phenomenon) that led him 
                                                 
1 The term ‘biological is not quite correct here as a biologist is always interested in the interactions between 
the organism and the natural environment. The term biological psychiatry often, though not necessarily, 
implies a more restricted reference suggesting that the illness is completely derived from endogenous 
factors. 
to appreciate the depth and archaicism of the normal primitive superego. Even within the 
most ordinary and most disregarded aspects of mental life (such as slips and symptoms), 
Freud found sublime aspects of the human struggle.  
 
In ‘Obsessive actions and religious practices’, Freud (1907) showed the clear parallel 
between the strange private ceremonials and rituals of the obsessional neurotic and those 
that accompany religious practices. Both centre on the need to keep separate good and 
bad, the sacred and the profane, and both have intense feelings of guilt and ways of 
dealing with it as central to their content. The difference is that obsessional rituals are 
idiosyncratic to the individual, whereas religious ceremonials are collective and 
stereotyped.  
 
This demonstration of the continuities between the apparently bizarre and abnormal and 
so-called normality, the insight that the achievements of human culture and the 
manifestations of human neurosis have more in common than our narcissism would 
regard as acceptable, is typical of Freud’s thought. He goes on to say (referring to the 
difference between the neurotic symptoms and the achievements of culture),  
 
‘The divergence resolves itself ultimately into the fact that the neuroses are 
asocial structures; they endeavour to achieve by private means what is effected 
in society by collective effort’ (Freud, 1907:73). 
 
Freud’s attitude to religion is symmetrical to his attitude to neurosis. For both these 
human creations he showed considerable respect, in particular for their contradictory 
nature. Both are expressions of human problems and of our attempts to resolve them; 
they display what is highest and what is lowest.  
 
Thus, in a certain sense psychoanalysis humanises our attitude to mental illness and 
serves as a useful break on those culturally endorsed projective systems that seek to view 
those suffering from mental illness as fundamentally ‘other’, not like us.  
 
Ms T formed a precipitately idealised relationship with her psychotherapist who she 
claimed was so different from the psychiatrist who was not ‘interested in her but only in 
his theories’. In one session her therapist made a mistake as to the age of her son. 
Suddenly the atmosphere changed. She turned on the therapist with scorn and contempt 
and said he was no different to anyone else; he obviously had never been listening to her 
at all. The atmosphere was now one of utter hopelessness. Later in her therapy she 
recounted that, as a child, to escape from a very disturbing situation at home, she ‘holed 
up’ in some caves nearby and painted over all the cracks in the cave with ‘magic paint’ 
in ordered to ‘stop the monsters getting in’.  
 
So one might say that she had, in the early phase of her therapy, used the magic paint of 
idealisation to create for herself a kind of personal sacred space, the cave of her 
childhood, where she could feel safe. The therapist’s mistake, however, opened a crack 
where ‘all the monsters’ could now get in (as revealed in her attack on the therapist). 
 When the emergency team visited Mrs X, a different patient with a known history of 
psychotic illness, they found her in a terrified state. She had covered all the windows and 
doors with 'sellotape' to prevent the evil rays getting into her flat.  
 
These two examples, one of a more neurotic situation and the other more clearly 
psychotic, serve to show how, despite the gross differences in mental state of the two 
patients, the content of their preoccupations is very similar. Both patients worked to 
create idealised retreats, a kind of personal religion, where they could be protected from 
destructive forces. In both situations the destructive forces, are felt to exist in the external 
world (in Ms As case the fantasied monsters, in Ms Xs case the evil rays). The content of 
their preoccupations is similar for both patients but the form it takes is entirely distinct. 
 
Historical Continuity - a Developmental Perspective  
A distinct but related feature of psychoanalytic explanation lies in its commitment to 
historical continuity. Freud’s (1905) Three Essays on Sexuality not only provided a 
model of sexual development and of understanding the sexual perversions, but introduced 
a method of understanding disorder in terms of development. Disorder manifests aspects 
of mental life which at a different developmental phase might have been normal. 
Although we never lose completely earlier ways of functioning, when these more archaic 
forms come to dominate mental life they become the basis of psychopathology. 
 
 Psychoanalysis always seeks to make manifest historical continuities that underlie 
apparent discontinuities, whether this be at the level of general psychological 
development or at a more specific level. For example, those moments of change or 
transformation that manifest themselves in what we term a breakdown, often present 
themselves as impressive discontinuities. Where such discontinuities occur apparently, 
part of the task will be to show continuities in functioning but at a less apparent level. 
This type of understanding not only imparts meaning to symptoms, but goes further as 
the following illustrates. 
 
Shortly after the death of his father Mr. D developed symptoms that were identical to 
those his father suffered. In the course of psychotherapy it was possible to understand 
that this expressed his identification with his father, unconsciously a way of keeping him 
alive. But it also expressed the guilt (making himself suffer) arising from the painful 
realization of feelings of triumph arising from death wishes towards the father. 
 
This understanding at one and the same time addresses the meaning of the symptom, and 
displays its causal structure and causal history2. 
 
Tom Freeman (1981), a psychoanalyst who worked in a general psychiatric setting, gives 
the following excellent illustration of the impressive manifest break in continuity that 
characterises a breakdown.  
                                                 
2 I am aware that I am touching on an important epistemological issue that cannot be dealt with here at any 
length. . For some, meanings and causes are entirely distinct whilst for others it is the intertwining of 
meaning and cause that characterises the human subject. It is this latter view which is consistent with 
psychoanalysis as discussed here. 
 A young man was admitted to hospital in an acute psychotic state. He said to the 
admitting psychiatrist, ‘‘If I look in your eyes you will be broken hearted.” “I am 
betraying you” 
 
Freeman learnt from others close to the patient that this overtly psychotic phase had been 
preceded by an introspective depressive period in which the patient felt worthless and 
helpless following a betrayal in love. In this melancholic state, all recriminations against 
the girl who betrayed him were directed not towards their real target but towards 
himself. In other words the young man, in a typically melancholic manner, identified with 
his girlfriend (it is he, not she, who is worthless, or as Freud put it ‘the shadow of the 
object fell upon the ego’ (Freud, 1917, p. 249)) and in this way maintained his 
idealisation of her. In the psychotic phase, however, there has been a further 
transformation. The patient has ‘solved’ his problem through a psychotic identification - 
he has become his girlfriend, it is he who is now the betrayer and someone else who is 
the betrayed, someone else who is ‘broken hearted’. The patient, because of the pain it 
brings, resists any restoration of continuity between the pre-psychotic and the psychotic 
phase. 
 
The very significant theoretical and technical developments in psychoanalysis since 
Freud have not altered its approach, in terms of the understanding of development, the 
link between development and pathology, and the relation of the ‘normal’ to the 
‘abnormal’. 
 Personality and Illness: a problematic distinction 
There is a further conceptual issue here that is of broad relevance but which is not 
immediately apparent. In psychiatric diagnosis it is important to distinguish between 
personality disorder and mental illness. This broad distinction has important relevance to 
the general appreciation of the patient and to rational plans for management. Such 
distinctions also have important value from an epidemiological perspective, particularly 
in terms of service planning. The kind of service necessary for mental illness, (which 
generally will be expected to be episodic, although episodes may be very long), will be 
different from that for personality disorder. In the latter there is a reasonable expectation 
that difficulties will be enduring, given they are functions of the whole personality 
structure.  
 
When it comes to the individual, however, the separation between ‘personality’ and 
‘illness‘ may in itself be problematic3. What appears as illness may be understood, 
psychoanalytically, as a personality development under the stress of certain internal and 
internal conditions.4 5  
 
                                                 
3 There is some growing sense that that the simplistic distinction between mental disorder and personality 
disorder (which underlies the differentiation of axes in DSM-IV) is questionable , see for example (Westen  
2006) 
4 By this I mean that some individuals may have a kind of  psychological ‘fault line’, which under the 
pressure of a toxic interaction between the sensitized internal world and particular malign external 
circumstance is stressed to the point of breakdown. The fault line, which is often the source of pervasive 
anxiety, may in other circumstances be managed and so not become manifest.  
5 A related issue here is that whereas psychiatrically one may speak of a patient as having more than one 
illness, from a psychoanalytic perspective the patient has only one illness which expresses itself in different 
way., and which is inseparable form his character. 
A breakdown manifests itself as a most impressive discontinuity, apparently, but when 
examined in more detail may show in bizarre and distorted form conflicts and 
preoccupations that were part of the personality prior to the breakdown. In fact the ability 
to help the patient integrate his pre- and post-breakdown state is an important part of 
working analytically with such conditions, as is the less welcome discovery that recovery 
is not recovery from the difficulties that brought about the illness. These continue, though 
at a less manifest level, within the character structure of the individual patient. This 
commitment, to the restoration of continuity to that which appeared to be discontinuous, 
again manifests the developmental perspective, central to psychoanalytic explanation. 
 
Mr A, an academic, suffered from a severe manic depressive disorder. When manic he 
felt himself to be possessed of a kind of knowledge that was absolute, that was his sole 
possession- and thus believed that he was the object of considerable envy. When 
depressed he felt himself to have been ejected from his epistemological paradise and 
now, as an inferior creature, the object of contempt by all. However during his so-called 
‘normal phases’, Mr A revealed himself to be still overwhelmingly preoccupied with his 
position relative to others; more precisely with his position in the mind of his primary 
object, originally his mother,  relative to others. This obsession, which governed all else 
in his life was, in his more normal phases kept hidden (though quickly made manifest in 
his analysis). 
 
Symptoms versus structures 
From a psychoanalytic perspective symptoms are the outward expression of deeper 
structures. Treatment therefore aims at understanding the underlying psychic structures as 
a route to removal of symptoms.  
 
Mr B, a man in his early thirties, presented in an agitated depression. It emerged that he 
was in an acutely bereft state having been abandoned by his girlfriend who had chosen 
instead his closest friend. This persecuted state seemed to be a manifestation of an 
oedipal depression; he felt forced to watch the couple, his fiend and his ex- girlfriend, 
both thought of as in a state of continuous pleasure and triumphing over him. However, 
within a few weeks of psychotherapy with a young woman therapist, he was ‘cured’. He 
was back at work, functioning well, feeling happy in the world and very far from his 
depression. Indeed, he had a new girlfriend who had herself chosen him over her 
husband. His sessions were full of long accounts of the virtues of his new girlfriend, 
which were related in such a way as to make his therapist feel, as she put it, like 
‘irrelevant observer’.  
 
From a symptomatic perspective the man is cured, but looking at things more deeply one 
might say that the psychic structure remains unaltered. The psychic furniture has not 
changed; there are still three ‘chairs’, two occupied by a couple and the other occupied 
by a depressed, excluded party. In his present life the last chair is now occupied by the 
husband of his girlfriend, and in his therapy by the therapist, the ‘irrelevant observer’. 
The excluded person is the target of a projective system which serves to rid the self of 
unbearable feelings of rejection/exclusion, now located in a third party. Such a situation 
is of course inherently unstable. 
 
This vignette serves to make a broader point; most patients tend to seek help at a point in 
their lives when there has been a breach in their ordinary defensive structure which 
protects them from psychic disturbance6. Their most urgent aim is thus to restore their 
psychic equilibrium in order to be free of unbearable psychic pain. Thus, in the initial 
phases the therapeutic situation is often used to restore the original structure, the status 
quo ante, and this is probably inevitable7. Some patients will leave treatment at this point 
having accurately perceived that continuing treatment, because it will undermine this 
defensive structure, threatens them with a return of symptoms. It is only managing the 
return of symptoms within the therapeutic setting, however, that can provide some real 
and durable protection against further breakdown. 
 
The role of agency 
From a psychoanalytic perspective an individual is never only a passive recipient of their 
illness, they are always involved in the manifestations of their disorder. 
 
Mrs P, a woman in her thirties, was referred for an assessment for psychotherapy. She 
had suffered from chronic depression for many years and had already undergone various 
                                                 
6 The popular term for this state is of course ‘a breakdown’ and in many ways it is quite accurate, as the 
cause of the disturbance is a breakdown in the capacity to maintain the defensive structure. The consequent 
state is usually of mixed anxiety and depression and this was the usual diagnosis up to the 1980’s, when 
many of these cases came to be diagnosed as suffering from depressive disorder. The phenomenology, 
however, remains the same although the label is different. 
7 For an excellent discussion of the subtle but profound effects of this need for psychic equilibrium see 
Joseph, 1992 
treatments. When invited to tell me of her difficulties at the beginning of the consultation 
she gave me a detailed and in many ways very competent account of the illness, much of 
which consisted in going through a list of symptoms. The atmosphere was one of utter 
lifelessness; she talked only of her symptoms and not of her self. It felt as if she was 
handing her ‘ill self’ over to me for consideration in a manner that was quite self-
objectifying. When I pointed this out to her, saying that she appeared to be wanting to 
give me a list of all the things that assailed her, to hand them over to me for diagnosis 
and recommendation for treatment without having to participate in this process at all, 
she started sobbing and said ‘I don’t think I have ever participated in anything in my 
life’. One could see here that an important move had taken place, where she showed a 
capacity for insight. Paradoxically, in her discussion of not participating, the patient was 
now participating in the interview in a way that was very real, but also quite disturbing.  
 
The point that I am making here is that it is sometimes only through an engagement 
which foregrounds the way the patient is relating, the way this reveals their 
psychopathology as a dynamic structure expressed in the relationship with the mental 
health professional, that one can form an adequate assessment of what the patient is 
seeking.  
 
The situation discussed here trenches upon the problematic distinction between ‘illness’ 
and ‘personality’ discussed above. But there is a further issue that is of some importance 
and it is this. Certain patients, because of the nature of their psychopathology, will 
pressure others to treat them as passive recipients of an illness, as is they have been 
infected by a kind of ‘depresso-coccus’. The doctor should prescribe antidepressants as if 
they were psychic antibiotics, and so treat the ‘illness’ as if it could be alienated from the 
rest of their personality. Some kinds of psychiatric approach can, unwittingly, collude 
with this objectification. 
 
I hope above I have shown some of salient features that characterise a psychoanalytic 
attitude to mental illness. Below, I will aim to show in more details the applications of 
this perspective to different situations. These will focus around the theme of the relation 
of the intra-psychic to the interpersonal, and the application of this knowledge base more 
generally in terms of psychoanalytic informed management and the understanding of the 
relation between the patient and staff. 
 
From the Intra-psychic to the Interpersonal 
In some of the case illustrations above I have already touched on the area of psychosis, 
but will here expand on this area. However, an important caveat can perhaps be stated at 
the outset. It is not being suggested here that the enormity of the problem of psychosis 
might be better dealt with by individual patients having available to them skilled 
psychotherapy. This is clearly unrealistic and in any case there are many patients who 
would not benefit from this approach. What is being suggested here is that a deeper 
understanding of the relation of the intra-psychic to the interpersonal can inform our 
understanding of psychosis, which can in turn contribute in an important way to the 
management of cases particularly in terms of the therapeutic milieu which forms a vital 
part of the treatment situation. This is something I will return to in the concluding part of 
this chapter. 
 
Freud’s classic account of psychosis, the Schreber Case (Freud, 1911) remains relevant 
today. Schreber, a highly intelligent judge, wrote a very detailed account of his psychotic 
illness which came to Freud’s attention. In form Schreber’s illness progressed from a 
severe anxiety state to the development of a delusional system, a frequent occurrence 
familiar to many psychiatrists. Many patients, suffering from a psychotic breakdown, 
present at first in an acutely anxious state. The patient is aware of something catastrophic 
happening to him, but he cannot describe it. He may be confused, say that he is falling to 
pieces, that the world has been altered in some indescribable way. Out of this chaos a 
delusional system ‘crystallises’, and this has the benefit with providing an explanation for 
what has been happening. Characteristically, such delusions take the form of messianic 
ideas (as in Schreber) or paranoid delusions8. One patient for example developed the 
delusion that the CIA had implanted a silica chip in his brain and were trying to control 
him for some malign purpose. It may seem that living in the grip of such thoughts would 
be unbearable, but psychiatrists and psychoanalysts have found that, once the full 
delusional system has developed, the patient often becomes much calmer. He is no longer 
confused as he now (delusionally) ‘knows’ what is happening to him. For Schreber, the 
                                                 
8 Freud observed that megalomania and paranoia are closely related and also that one can transform into the 
other. In the case of Schreber, what started off as a paranoid delusion (his belief that he was to be used 
homosexually by his doctor) transformed into the megolamanic delusion - God’s planned intercourse with 
him as the realisation of the messianic idea. 
changes inside him were all part of what he called ‘the order of things’; that is, it 
conformed to a grand metaphysical scheme9. 
  
Freud makes the point, and this remains relevant, that the delusion is not the illness per se 
but is the attempt to recover. ‘The delusional formation, which we take to be the 
pathological product, is in reality an attempt at recovery, a process of reconstruction’, 
writes Freud (Freud, 1911: 71). The central catastrophe is the loss and fragmentation of 
meaningful contact with the world and the delusional system is an attempt to rebuild a 
world of meaning. The delusion gives expression both to the inner catastrophe and to the 
attempt, with whatever limited resources, to recover from it.10 From this perspective, the 
                                                 
9 Schreber’s delusional system bears some resemblance to the crazy thinking so well captured by Stanley 
Kubrick’s film ‘Dr Strangelove’. One of the characters in the film, the mad general, is aiming to bring 
about a world apocalyptic scenario in order to rid the world of a terrible communist plot which he has 
endowed with omnipotent power, and which seeks to drain away his ‘precious bodily juices’. Unfortunately 
such thinking is not confined only to science fiction films as there are those, who occupy high positions of 
power in world politics, who believe in an Armageddon that will bring peace everlasting, presumably 
conceived as returning to a state of primary bliss. 
 
10 Freud (op cit) finds a poetic description of this process of catastrophe (the destruction of the inner world) 
and reconstruction in Goethe’s Faust : 
[Woe! Woe!] 
Thou hast it destroyed. The beautiful world, 
With powerful fist,  
In ruins t’ is hurled 
By the blow of a demigod shattered ... 
 
Mightier  
For the children of men, 
More splendid 
Build it again 
In thine own bosom build it anew. 
(Part 1, Scene 4) (quoted in Freud 1911 p.70) 
patient cannot be ‘cured of their delusions’ without any understanding of the condition 
that necessitates their construction11. 
 
A further feature is worthy of note here. The patient’s awareness that his inner world is in 
danger of total collapse is projected outwards. He does not say ‘my inner world is falling 
to pieces’ but instead that ‘the world is coming to an end.  
 
The work of Melanie Klein has considerably extended our understanding of such very 
disturbed states. She described primitive states dominated by the processes of splitting 
and projection. This account, through its more detailed understanding of the complex 
interrelationship between internal and external, provides a richer understanding of the 
psychotic world as exemplified by Schreber. Such patients conceive of themselves as 
having a special relation to good and evil forces. This can take place on a grand 
metaphysical scale (as with Schreber), or their concerns can be more local as in the 
following example. 
 
A psychotic young woman in hospital felt she had to protect all the patients from the evil 
doctors and nurses who she believed were determined on sexually abusing them. On 
talking to her, it seemed that she had split off good aspects of herself and projected them 
into the patients who had to be protected from her own violent sexual impulses, now 
located (again through projection) in the doctors. 
 
                                                 
11 This compares well with Marx’s discussion of religion where he criticises those who seek to urge people 
to abandon religion ( a symptom).  He writes, “To call on them to give up their illusions about their 
condition  is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions  ” p245 italics in original  
We find the more normal variant of this situation in fairy tales and also in religious 
doctrines, where the idealised fairy godmother is all good, and is kept widely apart from 
the wicked step-mother who is only bad. 
 
The interminable struggles between good and evil forces, so basic to all religious 
doctrine, from this point of view derive from our projection of the division in our own 
minds onto the heavens. Such narratives give representation to powerful internal 
struggles, the need to protect idealised internal objects from persecutors, and the use of 
omnipotence (magic etc.) to perform this task. 
 
Klein (1935, 1940) described a major developmental move, the depressive position, 
which brings momentous changes to the psychological landscape. The self and the world 
become more integrated and this brings a capacity to tolerate guilt and other forms of 
mental pain12. The pain felt at the inception of the depressive position is acute and often 
unbearable and so can be a source of dangerous acting out. This understanding adds a 
very important dimension to what underpins the familiar psychiatric observation that just 
at the point where a patient seems to be recovering from depression, the greatest 
vigilance is necessary because of the higher risk of self- harm.13 Progress brings the 
possibility of integration which in turn brings unbearable psychic pain. Where this can be 
borne (and this will include both internal and external factors) then further progress can 
                                                 
12 There is an important distinction to be made between ‘depressive illness’, a schizoid state of mind, and 
the ‘depressive position’. Although the latter may manifest painful states of mind including feelings of 
despair, loss and guilt, it is not a schizoid state. The painful aspects derive not from splitting and projection 
but from integration. 
13 Classically this was understood as related to the removal of the limitation on action imposed by the 
presence of psychomotor retardation. This is not inconsistent with the psychoanalytic perspective. 
be made. But where this pain cannot be managed it can be the source of suicidal 
enactment.  
 
Klein considerably enriched and broadened our understanding of the processes 
underlying splitting and projection. She described how in phantasy the mind can split off 
aspects of itself and project them into external figures, these figures becoming identified 
with what has been projected (a process she termed ‘projective identification’). This 
mechanism has very broad relevance to the understanding of the puzzling and disturbing 
relationships that psychiatric patients form with the mental health professionals looking 
after them14. The deepening of this understanding has been one of the major growth 
points in psychoanalysis in the last 50 years. It needs to be emphasised that the processes 
described by Klein are internal processes occurring within the individual. However, what 
we have come to understand is that all of us act upon the world to bring about the 
realisation of these phantasies so that they become real events in the world. In other 
words phantasies, to use Sandler’s (Sandler 1976) very apposite term, become actualised. 
 
Miss B, a patient in analysis, was internally dominated by a cruel primitive superego 
which she felt watched her every move. She experienced any attempt at self-control as in 
the service of this superego and so could not distinguish between it and ordinary ego 
functions that sought to protect her from danger, in other words the superego 
masqueraded as the ego. This resulted in a wholesale projection of her sane awareness of 
the danger she was in into her analyst. Left free of any concern for herself, Miss B took 
                                                 
14 For a fuller discussion of the origins and development of the concept of projective identification, see Bell 
(2001) 
increasingly dangerous risks, such as driving whilst under the influence of sedatives with, 
apparently, complete equanimity, whilst her analyst became increasingly horrified as the 
momentum of her self-destructiveness gathered pace. She said that she experienced the 
ending of sessions ‘like a guillotine’ . This was a very apt description as, having 
projected important ego functions into her analyst , she left the session in a ‘headless’ 
state. The situation deteriorated to such an extent that it became necessary to admit her 
to hospital. 
 
On the ward she behaved in a very provocative way to the nurses. She would go off the 
ward without telling them where she was going, leaving them with an overwhelming 
anxiety that she was about to carry out a very self-destructive attack. She might say for 
example, in an apparently calm way, that she was ‘going to the shops’ as if this was a 
quite ordinary and banal event, whilst at the same time conveying that she would be near 
the pharmacy where, by implication, she might buy some paracetamol. At other times she 
would telephone the ward from outside but not speak when a nurse answered and then 
hang up. The nurses found this unbearably tantalising. This resulted in an escalation of 
the need for the staff to control her and she was restricted from leaving the ward. The 
situation then further deteriorated and the nurses became worried that she might carry 
out a serious attack upon herself at any moment. The final result was that she was 
restricted to a small room where she was continuously observed. She then became 
acutely anxious and declared in a terrified voice,’ I can’t stand this place. I’m being 
imprisoned’. 
 
The patient here has ‘actualised’ (Sandler, op cit) her inner situation. What started out as 
an inner conflict between aspects of herself, an intra-psychic situation, has now been 
transported into a conflict between herself and the nursing staff, namely an interpersonal 
situation. The superego watching her all the time is of course inescapable, but temporary 
relief is achieved through projecting it elsewhere in this way. Now, it is not her own 
superego but instead it is the nurses on the ward who are felt to be imprisoning her. An 
inner situation has been transformed into a spatial one. 
 
 It is also important to note that the patient’s provocative manner did engender a good 
deal of hostility towards her which was never really owned by the staff. Although the 
maintenance of the patient under continuous observation served, manifestly, a wish to 
protect the patient from suicide, at a deeper level, it also, I think, satisfied a hatred which 
had been recruited in the staff and which was associated with some excitement. 
 
These situations are not uncommon. Many patients use admission to psychiatric wards to 
provide themselves with an immediate context for these projective procedures. Although 
in the last instance, no-one can be prevented absolutely from committing suicide, it is 
easy for staff to become identified with an omnipotence which dictates that whether the 
patient lives or dies is entirely their responsibility. They come to believe themselves to be 
the only ones capable of really understanding the patient. The determination to save the 
patient acquires a religiosity, as the staff come to believe themselves to be specially 
selected for this mission. Hostility that is denied and split off to this extent can quite 
suddenly return, and with a vengeance. Nurses and doctors who have felt impelled to see 
the patient only as a suffering victim, to repress any understandable hostility to the 
patient, may snap and suddenly find themselves thinking that the patient should no longer 
be tolerated, must be immediately discharged. Such situations, if they become the source 
of enactment, may even bring an apparent improvement, not based on any real 
development but through the gratification of the patient’s need for punishment; relieving 
him, temporarily of the persecuting omnipotent guilt. 
 
It was Tom Main (Main, 1957) who originally studied these processes in detail showing 
how the splits in the patients mind are relived, in the ward, as divisions among the staff. 
The ‘saintly’ group, described above, who endlessly suffer on behalf of the patient and 
who believe the patent to be only a victim of his damaging early relationships, have their 
counterpart in another group of staff who see the patient only as manipulative and 
‘attention seeking’, which must be ‘confronted’.  
 
Where these staff disturbances remain unacknowledged the situation can quickly 
escalate, with catastrophic results. The container, the ward, breaks down in its capacity to 
contain the patient and suffers a kind of institutional breakdown. It is important not to 
underestimate the effects of this kind of catastrophe on the staff, particularly in terms of 
persecuting guilt and feelings of worthlessness.  
 
Through its capacity to make manifest the manner in which illness relates to the 
underlying personality, the way in which it is expressed in relationships, psychoanalysis 
has provided us with a tool that enriches the phenomenological understanding of mental 
states; rendering them not only as static descriptions but as dynamic entities. This richer 
understanding can make a vital contribution towards the formulation of management 
plans, and also form a basis for understanding the patient’s way of relating to the team or 
institutional context that is providing his care. 
 
One of the central distinctions that I have found to be of real practical use in the day to 
day management of clinical problems is that between those states where a significant 
degree of perversity dominates the clinical picture and those where that is not the case. 
By the term perversity here I am referring, amongst other things, to those situations 
where the patient derives pleasure from his deterioration. This may have both masochistic 
and sadistic qualities; masochistic pleasure from his own self destruction, and sadistic 
pleasure from the tormented relationships he forms with the staff. This dimension is 
relatively independent of the psychiatric diagnosis. It is a frequent though insufficiently 
recognised problem in severe depressive states. Two patients manifesting the typical 
symptomatology of severe depression may in their different ways of relating reveal 
distinctions in degree of perversity, which in turn have important implications for rational 
management.  
 
It needs to be emphasised that in referring to perversity here I am referring not to a moral 
category but to a description. Further, there is no straightforward link between degree of 
perversity and aetiology. Some patients dominated by perverse modes of functioning 
have themselves, in childhood, been victim of prolonged perverse treatment, for others 
this does not seem to be the case.  
  
Mr. F was a 38 year old eastern European man who came from a very severely disturbed 
background, though disowned knowledge of this himself. He was admitted to a ward 
where I was working,  after a series of episodes of self harm including self cutting, 
overdosing and a serious attempt at drowning which required resuscitation. The 
diagnosis was of ‘treatment resistant depression’.  
 
He was clearly a very difficult patient to manage and I was asked to discuss the situation 
with the team. I learnt that Mr F was relentlessly negative, saying that he had nothing to 
live for, that his life was entirely meaningless. Mr L, his special nurse, saw it as his job to 
persuade him otherwise, but without any success  
 
Special care was provided for the patient on a daily basis. In discussion it emerged that 
there was a ‘politically correct’, so to speak, way of talking about him - that is as 
someone who was very ill, suffering, who needed special care; but there was another, 
much more negative view which it was difficult to own. 
  
As it became possible to talk more freely, however, staff spoke of the hatred that was 
stirred up in them. The nurse who was 'specialling' him described how all meetings were 
arranged by the team and never by the patient. The patient would reluctantly agree to 
come, but always added ‘.. if you think there is any point’. The staff felt extremely 
burdened with the day to day responsibility for keeping him alive and found it very 
difficult when the patient said he enjoyed being there (on the ward;) it was ’like being in 
a country spa’. It also emerged that a number of the nursing staff worried more about 
this patient than anyone else and further, that this worry invaded their personal lives to 
the degree that even when they were not on duty they thought about him and phoned up 
to make sure he was still alive. Each of them felt very alone with this worry, as if it was 
their own very personal responsibility.  
 
The crucial moment in discussion came when the senior consultant, Dr J, felt able to 
describe her distaste at a scene she was constantly exposed to when the patient’s wife 
visited the ward. They would exhibitionistically caress each other sexually in full view of 
the staff and patients. This was done just sufficiently to make it clear what they were 
doing, but not so much that it could be censured.  
 
We understood this in the following way. The very public excited ‘intercourse’ that was 
taking place on the ward made manifest the malignant type of continual ‘intercourse’ 
that was taking place between the patient and the staff. That is that projecting his wish to 
live to the degree that the staff continually felt responsible for keeping him alive, had 
become a source of addictive excitement for Mr. F. This excitement seemed to derive  
from at least  two sources: being rid of the burden of his wish to stay alive, but also from 
a perverse triumphant mockery of that wish, which the staff had to suffer for that wish 
was  now located in them 
 
From a psychoanalytic point of view Mr F belongs to that group of patients who project 
the wish to live into other people. Although some of these patients, having projected their 
wish to live, feel relieved and in fact can allow others to help them, this is not the case 
here where there is a more malignant relationship. The more the staff own the patient’s 
wish to live, the more the patient, so to speak, is free of it15. It is typical of these patients 
that they tend to overwhelm staff’s capacity to cope and anxiety about them tends to 
invade the personal life of the staff. In some situations staff feel that they cannot even 
have holidays. 
  
In order to be able to provide appropriate care for Mr F it would be necessary that those 
looking after him do not feel that they have to take full responsibility for whether he lives 
or dies (this is of course how they end up feeling, but it is important that this position is 
not supported externally).  
  
It is also very important in these situations that no individual member of staff be 
psychologically isolated with the patient and the team make sure that they regularly 
discuss their involvement with him. This is in order to avoid a splitting process (that is 
where, for example, one staff member can be idealised and another denigrated, or one 
staff member become drawn into unrealistic hopes for the future of the patient). 
 
Ms D appeared at first to be similar to Mr F. She too filled the staff with unbearable 
anxiety as to her suicidal capacity. Although at first perverse psychopathology seemed to 
predominate, over time this gave way to a more melancholic picture. She had made 
innumerable mutilating attacks on her skin by slashing it. Her skin seemed to represent 
                                                 
15 Hanna Segal  (1993 ) provides an excellent account of the triumph over the wish to live drawing on 
literature and clinical work. 
her sexual body which she regarded as disgusting. She felt full of ‘bad, disgusting 
thoughts’, particularly of abusing children. She felt that she could only rid herself of this 
identification with her abusing parent through quite literally cutting it out of her body. 
She had managed, however, to spare her face and hands and this appeared to represent a 
limited capacity to hold on to something good in herself.  
 
Once on the ward, however, she tended to project into the staff all awareness of these 
good aspects of herself, she herself sinking further and further into her melancholic state. 
The fact that in this case the staff felt able to maintain a belief in her, despite being 
constantly provoked, turned out to be of great therapeutic importance. Here the primary 
motive for this projection outside herself of her wish to live seemed to be more for 
‘safekeeping, perverse mockery being much less evident. After some improvement she 
too, like Mr F, showed a marked negative therapeutic reaction and became more acutely 
ill. Although there were some perverse elements the predominant difficulties arose from 
the unbearable psychic pain consequent on the awareness of damage done to her good 
objects16, which to some extent really was irreparable.  
 
Concluding Comments 
In this chapter I have focused on the patients internal world and his immediate context 
but, before closing I would like to give due recognition to the importance of the wider 
                                                 
16 The term ‘object’ here may require some explanation. This is a term used by psychoanalysts to refer to 
internal figures, laden with emotional significance, which , although largely unconscious, have  important 
determining effects upon our mental life.  For example, for some people their whole mental life is 
dominated by feelings of guilt /self blame. This is the conscious derivative of being unconsciously   
persecuted by ‘damaged internal object’s’.  
contexts within which this care takes place; these might be pictured as a series of 
containers rather like those Russian dolls17. So, at the first level there is the individual 
patient's mind and the disturbing thoughts and feelings it has to manage, then there is the 
relationship between the patient and his immediate carer (usually the primary nurse), then 
the context of that relationship, perhaps the psychiatric team and the ward18, then there is 
hospital/institutional structure, and so on up to very broad societal levels which would 
include Government policy. All these levels have important effects and at any moment 
one level may have a more determining effect than others. Further, different levels may 
act to support each other in a positive way, as occurs when intermediate management 
structures serve as buffers absorbing pressures from above and below, containing them 
and thus insulating other levels.  
 
Alternatively, as I have described elsewhere (Bell, 1996), anxieties instead of being 
contained are amplified as they are cascaded downwards through the system. The 
'marketisation' of health care creating competition between Trusts and fears of takeover, 
that is constant survival anxiety, can do considerable damage to the staff’s capacity to 
carry out their primary task, their primary source of satisfaction, and so do considerable 
damage to morale. 
 
                                                 
17 Although I have not in this chapter made explicit reference to Bion’s concept of ‘container-contained’ 
(Bion 1962)  this concept is central to much of the material discussed but particularly so in the following 
paragraphs  
18 A good illustrative example of the effects of the larger context is provided by Arthur Crisp (personal 
communication). He made a simple study logging daily the number of events of acutely disturbed 
behaviour occurring on a ward. Viewed from the narrow perspective of the immediate context each event 
seemed to have a more local cause, but what was revealed was a predictable rise in such incidents in 
relation to the proximity of the ward round.  
 
Managers on closely monitored performance reviews may become, understandably, 
unable to contain the enormous threat they are under. What starts off as high level Trust 
budgetary concern may, in such situations, be transmitted rapidly downwards through the 
system with the end result that a nurse finds himself inappropriately flooded with anxiety 
about a Trust’s future and so feels impelled to shape  admission and discharge policy 
with this as his determining consideration.  
 
Where there are supportive structures that can provide a framework for understanding the 
patient, the manner in which his difficulties are manifest in the relationship with his carer, 
where mental health workers can trust their immediate colleagues and superiors to be 
able to share with them how they ‘really’ think and feel about the patient, the ‘unofficial, 
or less ‘politically correct’ story, and where they can come to see that even the most 
bizarre and disturbed communications from the patients are not just ‘noise’ to be ignored 
but communications full of ordinary human meaning, then the scene is set for enthusiastic 
involvement in the work rather than the alienation and disillusionment that can so often 
come to dominate the ward and out patient settings.  
 
All psychiatric symptomatology is expressed within the context of human relationships. It 
is because of its capacity to grasp phenomenology as a living phenomenon in the 
relationship between the patient and his world, that psychoanalysis can make such a 
valuable contribution to the understanding and management of the individual patient and 
his wider context/milieu.This supports staff morale, one of the most important therapeutic 
elements in the care of the mentally ill and perhaps the one of the least studied. It receives 
insufficient attention in strategic plans for mental health.   
 
In 1953 a WHO report comparing the treatment in different psychiatric hospitals 
concluded that the most important single factor in the efficacy of the treatment given in a 
mental hospital is “an intangible element which can only be described as its atmosphere”. 
I hope in this chapter I have given some indication of the kind of activities that can make 
a substantial contribution to building and preserving this atmosphere. 
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